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BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is petitioner entitled to the benefits of Utan 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1953, as amended), for permanent total 
disability benefits based upon his physical impairments arising 
out of the industrial injury, pre-existing conditions and other 
extrinsic conditions, including age, education, employment 
skills and physical impairments? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission of Utah act 
arbitrarily or capriciously in reversing an order of the 
Administrative Law Judge awarding permanent total disaoili^y 
benefits? 
3. Did the Industrial Commission of Utah commit error 
of law by (1) misapplying the standard for review of an 
Administrative Law Judge's order; (2) misapplying the law 
related to employers' burden of proof in odd-lot cases; or (3) 
failing to consider substantial uncontroverted evidence of 
permanent total disability? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Alma E. Peck is a 65-year-old industrial maintenance 
mechanic who sustained several recent industrial injuries 
involving his left knee (September 12, 1980); right foot 
(November 16, 1982); and low back (December 19, 1982). The 
back and knee problems necessitated surgery and left claimant 
with permanent disability. The applicant sought industrial 
benefits for temporary total, permanent partial and permanent 
total disability under the provisions of Title 35 of the Code. 
All benefits were denied by his employer, Eimco Process 
Equipment Co. 
Mr. Peck filed for a hearing and presented evidence of 
accidental injuries occurring during the course of his 
employment. That evidence is uncontroverted and apparently not 
at issue on appeal. Subsequent to the initial hearing and 
submission to a medical panel, the Administrative Law Judge, 
adopting the findings of the medical panel, determined the 
following impairments pre-existed the September 12, 1980 
accident: 
1. Right ankle - 7%; 
2. Hearing loss - 5%; 
3. Cervical - 5%; 
4. Left wrist - 2%; 
5. Left knee - 2%; 
6. Right arm - 1%. 
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A combined whole-body rating of 21%, together with an 
additional 3% for cervical degeneration, subsequent to 
September 1980 but before the December 1982 accident, was 
rendered to the applicant by the medical panel for a whole-body 
combined rating of 24%. 
The medical panel then rated the September 1980 injury 
to the right knee at 2% and the December 1982 low back injury 
at 10%. Thus, 12% impairment was due to the industrial 
accidents, combining with the pre-existing 24% to 33% 
whole-body disability (R.179-188). 
As of the date of the hearing, applicant was 64 years 
of age. He attended high school in Carey, Idaho, having 
graduated in 1937 and essentially had no other formal 
education. Since that date, his work was considered primarily 
labor with emphasis in welding, blacksmithing and maintenance, 
all of which required significant movement and lifting ability. 
Subsequent to the surgery necessitated by the December 
1982 industrial injury, and following his convalescence, the 
applicant returned to light-duty work with Eimco in June 1983. 
His light-duty restrictions were not released (R.166). Mr. 
Peck testified that he was not able to perform his normal work 
activities but for the charity of individuals working with him 
(R.166). This situation continued through a reorganization of 
the department and until a time when the applicant felt that 
his presence in the department was a liability to himself and 
others with whom he worked (R.168). Thus, after approximately 
nine months, Mr. Peck terminated employment. It was never his 
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intent to voluntarily retire since he had no other income and 
little retirement (R.168). The only amount he receives from 
Eimco for full retirement benefits is $53.30 per month (R.174), 
out of which $34.00 per month is deducted for his spouse's 
health insurance (R.169). This net sum, $19.30 per month, is 
hardly an incentive to voluntarily terminate employment wmch 
provided an opportunity to earn in excess of $1,800.00 per 
month (R.15). 
Mr. Peck then applied for consideration of permanent 
total disability benefits (R.126). A separate evidentiary 
hearing was held, after which Mr. Peck was referred to Mr. 
Richard Olson, a rehabilitation counselor with the State 
Rehabilitation Office, who determined that applicant was not a 
good candidate for rehabilitation because of his age, physical 
impairment, continued deterioration in his health, and the 
general overall appearance of a man who has worked an extended 
time and was then, and is now, suffering from physical 
impairments and general deterioration associated with age 
(R.217). The Administrative Law Judge then ordered payments of 
permanent total disability based upon applicant's age, 
education and medical infirmities. It is upon that order that 
the Second Injury Fund and the employer appealed to the 
Industrial Commission. The Commission reversed, holding that 
applicant had voluntarily retired and was thus not entitled to 
the permanent total benefits awarded. This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Applicant is permanently totally disabled and 
should receive benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67. 
2. The Industrial Commission's denial of benefits is 
contrary to law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPLICANT IS PERMANENTLY TOTALLY DISABLED 
AND SHOULD RECEIVE BENEFITS PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-67. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order set 
forth Mr. Peck's prima facie claim to permanent total 
disability benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67. A separate 
hearing was held for the specific purpose of determining Mr. 
Peck's status. Thereafter, Mr. Peck was referred to the 
Rehabilitation Office in accordance with the mandate of Section 
35-1-67. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, while 
relucantly given, were consistent with this Court's holding m 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 
1984). The order is also consistent with numerous other 
holdings of this Court. Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 
P.2d 790 (Utah 1981); Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981). 
The Industrial Commission reversed the Administrative 
Law Judge's order agreeing with defendants' arguments that 
since the applicant returned to work after his surgery and 
before his termination from employment, then, a_ fortiori, Mr. 
Peck was able to return to his normal and usual occupation, and 
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therefore vas forever barred from claiming the benefits of 
Section 35-1-67. Such a narrow interpretation cf that section 
/ould ^e^i rhat once an individual attempts to return to /orK, 
light duty or otherwise, he has become forever barred from 
suosequen^ly seeking permanent total disability benefits. That 
interpretation is wholly inconsistent with prior holdincis or 
this Court. See Meacham v. Industrial Commission ot Utah, t>a2 
P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978). 
The Commission's rationale is also inconsistent with 
the odd-lot doctrine recognized in virtually every jurisdiction 
and specifically adopted in the recent case of Marshall v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, supra. That doctrine holds that 
total disability may be found in workers who, while not 
altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they 
will not be employed regularly m any well known branch ot the 
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable 
dependability with which a claimant can sell his services in a 
competitive labor market undistorted by such factors as 
business oooms, sympathy from employer cr fellow workers, zi 
superhuman efforts despite the claimant's crippling handicaps 
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.51 at 10-154.49; :ee 
also, § 57.64(b) at 10-164.154 through 10-164.164. 
Elements of the odd-lot doctrine include irregularity 
or unpredictability of the quality, quantity and overall 
performance of the employee's work record. These elements were 
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clearly shown to have existed in favor of a finding that Alma 
Peck was not able to continue in his normal occupation. 
Many states, including our own, only require that the 
claimant demonstrate a prima facie case for total disability. 
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the 
availability of steady work regularly available to him. 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra. Among the 
classifications of cases defined as "odd-lot" are a number of 
cases involving a voluntary quitting with no element of 
misconduct. If a claimant quits his job for reasons having 
nothing to do with an industrial injury, obviously he should 
not be entitled to claim permanent total benefits. However, if 
a claimant quits because he cannot continue to perform his 
former duties primarily because of pain or other functional 
incapacity left by reason of pre-existing conditions and his 
industrial injury, the quitting then forms no impediment to a 
finding of compensable permanent total disability. While the 
number of reasons for quitting are limited, the central issue 
is the same: Was the disability in any significant degree a 
factor in the decision to resign or retire? If the motive is 
merely to get a better job or to obtain more job security, 
change residence or family status, then the answer is no. 
There are few cases directly on point where the reasons for 
quitting were because of continuous pain, reduced quantity or 
quality of work performance, and fear of creating danger to 
others. Most, however, have applied the procedure adopted by 
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this Court in Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
supra. See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.64(b), 
supra. If the applicant is able to demonstrate a prima facie 
entitlement, then the burden should shift to the employer. In 
this matter, the employer was given every opportunity to defend 
and to present evidence of steady employment available to Mr. 
Peck, but failed to do so. 
Defendants may argue that their burden was met by 
merely demonstrating the applicant returned to work in 
approximately June 1983, and continued to work until his 
retirement in April 1984. This contention, whether adopted by 
the Industrial Commission, the Adminitrative Law Judge or the 
defendants, is simply inconsistent with uncontradicted and 
believable substantial evidence to the contrary. Applicant 
testified that he needed to work beyond his 65th birthday in 
order to qualify for meaningful benefits (R.169), not for the 
rather meager sum of $53.00 gross per month. Yet, because of 
his physical inability, pain, charity from fellow workers and 
belief that he could constitute a danger to others, he was 
forced to quit. Had he been able to continue his work, he 
would have built upon a meaningful retirement benefit and would 
have been able to save for the future. Since this industrial 
injury contributed in major part to his termination, Mr. Peck 
should rightfully be entitled to the continued benefits of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. 
The employer cannot meet its burden through Mr. Peck's 
testimony. The monetary facts and vocational findings all 
-8-
support the Adminstrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding permanent total 
disability benefits. 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DENIAL 
OF BENEFITS IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The rule of law in this and other odd-lot cases is 
clearly and umambiguously set forth in Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, supra. For that reason, the Administrative 
Law Judge felt compelled to award benefits to Mr. Peck in spite 
of his personal belief to the contrary. Clearly, Mr. Peck had 
demonstrated a prima facie case; clearly the employer failed to 
meet its shifted burden of proof. 
Defendants may assert that the Administrative Law 
Judge "found that the applicant did in fact return to work and 
did perform the previous duties required in his occupation" 
(R.228). Such a finding, if upheld, is wholly unsupported by 
any evidence in the record. In fact, all substantial evidence 
is to the contrary. The Industrial Commission cannot simply 
choose to disbelieve the applicant's uncontradicted testimony 
simply to enforce their personal beliefs as to what the law is 
or ought to be. 
Defendants' argument that once an employee returns to 
his former duties he is forever barred from obtaining benefits 
under Section 35-1-67 is without merit and inconsistent with 
the policy behind worker's compensation statutes. See Meacham 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra. Neither do these 
arguments consider applicant's "progressive" disease for which 
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the medical panel gave a 2.5% whole-body rating between 
September 1980 and December 1982, and another 2.5% whole-body 
rating since that date to the date of the panel evaluation. 
This same progression was noted by the rehabilitation officer: 
It is my feeling that Mr. Peck is not a good 
candidate for rehabilitation because of his 
age, physical impairment, continued deteriora-
tion in his health, including the arthritis 
in his foot, and the general overall appearance 
of a man who has worked an extended time and is 
now suffering from the physical impairments and 
the general deterioration associated with age 
(R.217). 
The Commission's order granting defendants' motion for 
review was based entirely upon the Administrative Law Judge's 
interpretation of law as set forth in Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, supra. The Commission adopted the 
defendants' argument that because Mr. Peck returned to work 
following his light release by his doctors, Marshal1 did not 
apply. The Commission chose to reverse (rather than remand) 
the order and thereby deprive applicant of permanent total 
disability benefits. At a minimum, the Commission failed in 
its duty by not reviewing the substantive evidence presented by 
the applicant concerning his reasons for termination and their 
relationship to the industrial injury; failed to properly 
consider or apply the holding of this Court in Marshall v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah; and failed to afford applicant 
procedural and substantive due process of law in choosing 
simply to disbelieve his uncontroverted testimony. 
-10-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons specifically set forth by this Court 
in Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, the applicant, 
Alma E. Peck, should be entitled to receive permanent total 
disability benefits. The Industrial Commission's summary 
reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Oraer awarding such benefits is wholly 
inconsistent with law, ignores substantial uncontroverted 
evidence of permanent total disability, and is arbitrary and 
capricious. It is respectfully suggested that this Court 
vacate the Industrial Commission's Order and remand this matter 
to enter the original Order granting permanent total benefits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ftf day of February, 
1986. 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 801/533-8 383 
By A /"G-t^. 
^ yRoqei^B< Sandack 
Attorney for Applicant 
2702L 
/^^y^^^^~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that four true and correct 
copies of the Brief of Petitioner were placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following persons on 
this day of February, 1986: 
Ralph L. Finlayson 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
Erie Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert Finch 
4322 Vallejo Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Attorney for Eimco Process 
Equipment Co. 
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A D D E N D U M 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALMA E. PECK, 
Petitioner, ; 
vs. ; 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO., ] 
SECOND INJURY FUND and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ; 
UTAH, 
Respondents. 
) DOCKETING STATEMENT 
) Case No. 20914 
Petitioner respectfully submits the following 
Docketing Statement pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure: 
I. JURISDICTION 
Authority to review this matter is conferred upon this 
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 (1953, as amended). 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Workmen's Compensation Division. 
III. DATE OF ORDER 
Petitioner seeks review of the Industrial Commission's 
Order Granting Motion for Review, dated August 30, 1985, by the 
filing of a Petition for Writ of Review, dated September 27, 
1985. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner is a 65-year-old industrial mechanic 
employed by respondent Eimco Process Equipment Co. Petitioner 
suffered a back injury as a result of an industrial accident 
occurring during the course of his employment on December 19, 
1982. As a result of this accident, subsequent back surgery 
necessitated by the accident, several prior injuries received 
during the course of his employment with Emico Process 
Equipment Co., and other pre-existing medical impairments, the 
Medical Panel found permanent partial disability as follows: 
Right ankle - 7%; 
Hearing loss - 5% 
Cervical - 10%; 
Left wrist - 2%; 
Left knee - 2%; 
Right arm - 1%; 
Right knee - 2%; 
Low back - 10%. 
The Industrial Commission found a combined 12% 
permanent partial impairment due to the industrial accident of 
December 1982, together with a combined 33% whole-body 
disability due to all conditions using the Hair computations. 
Petitioner requested a finding of permanent total 
disability because of his age, education and medical 
impairments. After hearing, petitioner was referred to the 
Utah State Department of Rehabilitation Services pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67, which found applicant was not a good 
candidate for rehabilitation. The Administrative Law Judge 
then entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order 
-2-
awarding petitioner permanent total disability benefits 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67. 
Respondent Second Injury Fund filed a motion to review 
the Administrative Law Judge's decision principally upon the 
ground that petitioner worked following his surgery and 
voluntarily retired from his employment. The Industrial 
Commission granted this motion to review and entered its own 
findings without ever seeing the petitioner or reviewing his 
testimony that his work consisted of charity by fellow workers 
and that he was forced to retire in spite of his previous 
desire to continue working. 
V. ISSUES 
1. Is the petitioner entitled to the benefits of Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 for permanent total disability benefits 
based upon his age, education, employment skills and physical 
impairments? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission act arbitrarily by 
failing to affirm the order of the Administrative Law Judge 
awarding such permanent total disability benefits or by failing 
to remand the same for further evidentiary findings if it felt 
such were necessary? 
VI. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW 
Petitioner relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67, and 
Noland Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1984) . 
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VII. ATTACHMENTS 
Attached hereto and made a part hereof are the 
following necessary attachments: 
1. The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Motion 
to Review, dated August 30, 1985; 
2. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
entered by the Administrative Law Judge, dated February 28, 
1985; and 
3. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Review, filed 
September 27, 1985. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 1985, 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 8 01/53 3-83 83 
landack 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2532L 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that true and correct copies 
foregoing DOCKETING STATEMENT were placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following persons on this/&£>~-
day of October, 1985: 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Robert Finch, Esq. 
559 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Erie Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No.83000275 
* 
ALMA E. PECK, * 
* 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO., * 
and SECOND INJURY FUND * 
* 
Defendant. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On February 28, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued an Order, which was supplemented by a later Order issued on March 26, 
1985. The two Orders taken together provided that the defendant company pay 
permanent total disability*, benefits to the Applicant based on a percentage of 
the whole person impairment which resulted due to two industrial accidents the 
Applicant had while employed with the defendant company. The Second Injury 
Fund was directed to pay the Applicant permanent total disability benefits 
based on the percentage of the whole person impairment that existed prior to 
the industrial injuries. Upon review of the file and the Administrative Law 
Judge's Orders, the Commission is of the opinion that the case does not 
warrant an award of permanent total disability benefits« A review of the file 
follows. 
The Applicant was employed with the defendant company as an 
industrial maintenance mechanic. The industrial injuries at issue, in this 
particular filing, involved a left knee injury which occurred on September 12, 
1980, which necessitated surgery which was performed on October 17, 1980. 
There was next a right foot injury occurring on November 16, 1982, and 
finally, a back injury on December 19, 1982. Following the back injury, the 
Applicant returned to work, but was later hospitalized on March 17, 1983 for 
back surgery. The Applicant was discharged on March 24, 1983, and an 
Application for Hearing was filed by the Applicant and his attorney on March 
30, 1983. The Application stated that the Applicant sought permanent partial 
impairment benefits as the result of the September 12, 1980 knee injury, and 
the November 16, 1982 foot injury, as well as temporary total disability and 
permanent partial impairment benefits for the December 29, 1982 back injury. 
In answer to the Application, the defendant company stated that it sought 
reimbursement from the Applicant for temporary total disability benefits and 
medicals paid for the September 12, 1980 knee injury, as the defendant alleged 
the defendant was not liable for these benefits it had paid as there was no 
industrial accident. The defendants further contended, that no further 
benefits were due the Applicant for the November 16, 1982 foot injury, and no 
benefits at all due the Applicant for the December 29, 1983 back injury, as no 
accident occurred on that date either. 
RECEIVED 
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On June 27, 1983, the Applicant returned to work. On October 17, 
1983 a hearing was held which resulted in an appointment of a medical panel on 
October 19, 1983. On February 3, 1984, the Commission received the medical 
panel report which is quoted extensively in the Administrative Law Judge1s 
February 28, 1985 Order. On April 27, 1984, the Applicant turned sixty-five 
years old, and on April 28, 1984, the Applicant retired from his position with 
the defendant. The Applicant's attorney filed a generalized objection to the 
medical panel report, which included a request for an award of permanent total 
disability benefits for the Applicant on June 7, 1984. The Administrative Law 
Judge wrote the Applicant and his attorney, and informed them that the request 
for permanent total disability benefits was denied. A second hearing was held 
on September 25, 1984. The medical panel submitted a clarification of the 
medical panel report on October 5, 1984. On November 8, 1984, the Commission 
received a report from a Rehabilitation Counselor of the Utah State Office of 
Education, which concluded that the Applicant was not a good candidate for 
rehabilitation due to the Applicant's age, physical impairment, and general 
health deterioration. 
On February 28, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge issued his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Adopting the medical panel 
findings as his own, he vawarded permanent total disability benefits citing, 
Nolan Marshall v. Emery Mining, case No. 19153, filed April 5, 1984, as 
precedent for the award. The Administrative Law Judge stated in his 
Conclusions of Law, that the Marshall case "mandated" the award of benefits, 
and that he made the award "reluctantly". This reluctance is understandable 
considering the Administrative Law Judge's further statements, that the 
Applicant did not leave work on April 28, 1984 because of old or new injuries 
and that the Applicant "just plain retired". The defendant filed objections 
to the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on 
March 18,1985, stating that the Marshall case could be factually distinguished 
from the instant case, that the percentages the Administrative Law Judge used 
did not correctly account for Hair adjustments, and that once again, there was 
no compensable knee injury on September 12, 1980. In response to this, the 
Administrative Law Judge issued a supplementary Order on March 26, 1985, 
stating specifically th?-t compensable accidents occurred or. all three dates in 
issue. A Motion for Review was filed by the Second Injury Fund, stating that 
Applicant returned to work after his most recent industrial accident, which 
disqualified the Applicant from receiving permanent total disability benefits, 
based on the Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-6 7 requirement that the 
Applicant show that industrial impairment prevented the Applicant from 
performing his former work. 
We agree with the arguments set forth by the defendants and the 
Second Injury Fund. The Marshall case involves a factual setting that is 
different than the facts here involved. In the Marshall case, the Applicant 
was unable to return to work after his industrial accident. Here, the 
Applicant obviously was able to return to work because in fact he did. The 
Applicant worked for nearly one full year after his final industrial accident, 
and retired one day after he turned sixty-five years old. The facts in this 
case do not show that the Applicant has met his burden in showing inability to 
return to work as is required by Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-69. And 
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because this case is factually dissimilar to the Marshall case, an award of 
permanent total disability benefits to the instant Applicant is not "mandated" 
by the holding in that case. Therefore, we reverse the Administrative Law 
Judge's Orders of February 28, 1985 and March 26, 1985 and award instead, 
permanent partial impairment benefits. 
As we read the medical panel report, there were only two ratable 
impairments as the result of the two industrial injuries on September 12, 1980 
and December 29, 1982. The November 16, 1982 foot impairment did not result 
in permanent impairment. The impairments pre-existing before September 12, 
1980 were as follows: 
WHOLE BODY IMPAIRMENT 
7% 
5% 
5% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
Total Combined Pre-Existing Impairment 
= 21% 
Cervical degeneration occurring after the September 12, 1980 
incident, and before the final industrial accident on December 29,1982, 
amounted to 2.5% or an additional 3% causing the combined total pre-existing 
impairment, at the time of the December 29, 1980 accident, to be 24% of the 
whole body. The industrial impairments at issue in this case are only two. 
Right knee 9/12/80 2% 
Back 12/29/82 10% Combined total of 12% 
Using the Hair computation, the 12% represented above computes to a 
total of 9% of the whole body, due to the pre-existing impairments. The total 
impairment computes to 33% of the whole body (24% + 9%). 
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the 
defendants must pay 16 weeks of total temporary disability at the maximum rate 
of $284.00 a week amounting to $4,544,00. This amount is subject to a 24/33 
reimbursement by the Second Injury Fund which is equal to 73% of $4,544.00 or 
$3,317.12. The permanent partial impairment the defendants must pay is 1.6% 
of 312 weeks or 4.9 weeks at $153.00 per week ($749.70) for the 1980 accident 
plus 7.4% of 312 weeks or 23 weeks at $189.00 per week ($4,347.00) for the 
1982 accident totaling of $5,096.70. The permanent partial impairment the 
Second Injury Fund must pay is 21% of 312 weeks, or 65.5 weeks, at $153.00 per 
week ($10,021.50) for the pre-existing conditions as of September 12, 1980, 
and 3% of 312 weeks or 9.3 weeks, at $189.00 per week ($1,757.70) for the 
Right ankle 
Hearing 
Cervical 
Left wrist 
Left knee 
Right arm 
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cervical degeneration pre-existing the December 29, 1982 accident only, 
totaling $11,779.20. All amounts due are accrued and are to be paid as lump 
sums. The attorney*s fees payable to Roger D. Sandack are in the amount of 
$3,962.68. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge's Orders of 
February 28, 1985 and March 26, 1985 are hereby reversed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay Applicant at the rate of 
$284.00 per week for 16 weeks or a total of $4,544.00 a? compensation for 
temporary total disability less benefits paid heretofore. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay Applicant* compensation 
at the rate of $153.00 per week for 4.9 weeks or a total of $749.70 as 
compensation for 1.6% permanent partial impairment, and at the rate of $189.00 
per week for 23 weeks or a total of $4,347.00 for 7.4% permanent partial 
impairment, for a combined total of $5,096.70 which sum is accrued and payable 
in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay Roger D. Sandack, 
attorney for the Applicant, the sum of $3,962.68, to be deducted from the 
award specified above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer as Custodian 
of the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the defendant to the extend of 73% of 
the amounts expended herein for temporary total disability, and medical 
expenses, upon the filing of a duly verified petition certifying the amounts 
expended. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to pay to the Applicant at the rate of 
$153.00 per week for 65.5 weeks, or a total of $10,021.50, as compensation for 
pre-exisiting impairment consisting of 21% of the whole person, and at the 
rate of $189.00 per week for 9.3 weeks, or a total of $1,757.70, for 
pre-existing impairment consisting of 3% of the whole person, for a combined 
total of $11,779.20 which sum is accrued and payable in a lump sum. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
_£5£l^day of August, 1985 
ATTEST: 
JML 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Walter T. AxeigardtV 
Commissioner 
LenicV-L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on August , 1985 a copy of the attached 
Granting of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Roger D. Sandack, Attorney, 500 Kearns Bldg., 136 South Main, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert Finch, Attorney, 559 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102 
Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
Alma E. Peck, 56 West Sunset Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
ALMA Ec PECK, 
VS. 
Applicant, 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 83000275 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARINGS: 1) Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 17, 1983, at 8:30 
o'clock a.m. 
2) Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on September 25, 1984, at 8:30 
o'clock a.m. 
Said hearings were pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by Roger D. Sandack, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Defendant was represented by Robert R. Finch, Attorney at 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Applicant is claiming benefits for three separate incidents, each 
of which he claims occurred during the course of his employment. 
On September 12, 1980, the Applicant was crawling on a cement floor 
and his right knee locked up. He was examined by Dr. Beck and surgery was 
performed October 7, 1980. The Applicant had a similar operation on the left 
knee back in the 1970's. On November 16, 1982, the Applicant was attempting 
to loosen a pipe joint and was standing on a wrench when the pipe broke 
allowing his right foot to come down hard causing immediate pain for which he 
was taken to the emergency hospital. Medical benefits and temporary total 
disability compensation were paid. The Applicant indicates that he still has 
RECEIVED 
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some problem with the right foot and tends to walk more on the toe rather than 
on the ball of the foot. 
On December 29, 1982, the Applicant and an associate employee were 
installing two eleven-foot sections of metal ladder. The lower section was 
installed and in order to install the next section an employee was up above 
pulling the ladder up by rope and the Applicant was walking up the lower 
ladder lifting the new section with his arms. The upper end of the ladder 
caught on something and the Applicant was jerking on the lower part of the 
ladder with his right arm attempting to pull it out and away from whatever was 
blocking it. As he was pulling with his right arm he felt a pain in his lower 
back radiating into his hips. He told his partner to tie off the ladder 
because he had hurt his back and then went immediately to report the incident 
to his supervisor and ask for an additional man to complete the job. The 
Applicant rested over the holiday, attempted to go back to work but found it 
necessary to go to the company doctor January 11, 1983, who diagnosed his 
problem as muscle spasms and prescribed medication and therapy with Robert 
Greene and x-rays were taken at the Holy Cross Hospital. He was continued on 
the job. While he was still taking therapy he was attempting to hook some 
heavy cables onto a crane and felt additional intense pain. His back gave him 
constant pain from that time on. Dr. Slawson recommended further examination 
by Dr. Charles Rich who on February 21, took a CAT scan followed by a 
myelogram and then surgery was performed March 17, 1983, with the Applicant 
returning back to work June 27, 1983. No specific restrictions were imposed 
but the treating physician instructed the Applicant and his employer that he 
should be cautious with his back and not strain it. The Applicant indicated 
that he had to be careful and continued to have some pain in his back and in 
his right leg. 
By way of history the Applicant had some ear infection problems in 
the right ear but claimed no disability. Sometime in 1960 he injured his 
right elbow resulting in several operations. In the 1950*s or *60's the 
Applicant crushed his right ankle with a posthole digger which required 
considerable treatment. Back in about 1940 the Applicant had a horse fall 
with him hurting his back for which he visited a chiropractor but had no other 
medical treatment and lost no time from work. In 1970 the Applicant injured 
his left knee while working for Ajax Press on which Dr. Kezerian performed 
surgery. The Applicant also claimed some bronchial problems which give him 
some difficulty if he is exposed to dust or smoke. 
The medical aspects of the case were referred to a Medical Panel for 
evaluation. The Medical Panel returned its Report copies of which were 
provided to the various parties. The Applicant filed an objection to the 
Report only to preserve his claim for a finding of permanent and total 
disability. A hearing was held on the objections. The Medical Panel Report 
was received in evidence and the Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings 
of the Panel as his own which are as follows: 
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"(1) Applicant's physical impairment as a result of all causes and conditions 
is as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6, 
7. 
8. 
9, 
10. 
Left knee 
Right knee 
Right foot 
Right ankle 
Back 
Right upper ext 
Cervical 
Left wrist 
Left hand 
Right hand 
5% lower 
5% lower 
0% 
25% 
10% 
2% 
10% 
5% 
0% 
0% 
ext. 
ext. 
Old industrial 1970 
Industrial 9-12-80 
Insufficient to rate 11-16-
82 
Old injury & cause of foot 
pain 
Due to 12-29-82 
Old problem shoulder-elbow 
Non-industrial degeneration 
Old fracture 
Insufficient to rate 
Insufficient to rate 
Body 
2% 
2% 
0% 
7% 
10% 
1% 
10% 
2% 
0% 
0% 
11. Bronchial problems 0% (respiratory, 
consultation by 
Dr. Noehren) 
12. Hiatus hernia 0% (not further in-
vestigated-insufficient to rate) 
13. Hearing loss 32% right (audio-Binaural impairment 5.33% 
logy eval-
uation by 
Rex Scott, M.S.) 
Physical impairment as a result of all causes and conditions is combined 
to 33% permanent loss of body function. 
"(2) Applicant's permanent physical impairment attributable to industrial 
injuries listed is as follows: 
a. 9-12-80 Right knee 5% of lower extremity or 2% of body. 
b. 11-16-82 Right foot, insufficient to rate, recurrent foot pain is a 
result of limitation of motion of the ankle from old accident. 0% 
c. 12-19-82 back 10% loss of body function. 
Combined values of a. and c. 12% permanent loss of body function. 
"(3) Pre-existing permanent physical impairment is listed as follows, whether 
due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes. 
a. Prior to the date of 9-12-80 body 
(1) Left knee 5% lower ext. 2% 
(A) Right ankle 25% 7% 
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(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(13) 
Right upper ext. 
Cervical 
Left wrist 
Hearing loss 
2% 
5% 
5% hand 
32% right Binaural 
1% 
5% 
2% 
5.33% 
Combined values equals 20% loss of body function. 
Prior to the date of 11-16-82 
(1) Left knee 
(2) Right knee 
(A) Right ankle 
(6) Right arm 
(7) Cervical 
(8) Left wrist 
(13) Hearing loss 
All impairment 
impairment. 
pre-
5% lower ext. 
5% lower ext. 
25% 
2% 
7.5% (2.5 due to natural pro-
gression since 9-12-80) 
5% 
32% right 
-existing 11-16-82 combines to 25% 
2% 
2% 
7% 
1% 
7.5% 
2% 
5.3% 
permanent physical 
c. Permanent physical impairment pre-existing 12-29-82 is unchanged from b. 
inasmuch as no permanent impairment was assigned to the alleged foot injury of 
11-16-82. 
••There has been a 2.5% increase of the cervical spine due to natural progres-
sion between 9-12-80 and 12-29-82. There has been a further 2.5% increase in 
the cervical spine due to natural causes from 12-29-84 to the present. These 
are included above in their proper places." 
The overall combined impairment is 33%, 12% of which is related to 
industrial causes. Though the Panel indicates pre-existing was 25% we note 
that part of that included an industrial injury from 1980 and therefore we are 
treating the pre-existing as 21%. The Applicant requested a finding of 
permanent and total disability pursuant to the standards set in the John 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission case of April 1984. The matter was referred 
to the rehabilitation counsellor who found that the Applicant, who is now 
sixty-five years old, together with his other deteriorating health conditions 
was not a good candidate for rehabilitation. 
With great reluctance the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
Applicant is permanently and totally disabled under the present case holdings, 
and is entitled to benefits accordingly. We believe the Marshall case 
mandates such a finding but we do believe the finding in that case is in 
error. Workmen^ compensation benefits should not be confused with retirement 
benefits and should not be brought into a retirement situation either to be a 
substitute for or a supplement to retirement. In this case the Applicant was 
last injured December 29, 1982. After treatment and surgeries he returned to 
work June 27, 1983, and worked up to his sixty-fifth birthday on April 22, 
1984, and voluntarily terminated on April 28, 1984. 
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The Applicant worked effectively before the December 1982 injury 
despite his 27% pre-existing impairment which included such things as hearing 
loss. The December 1982 incident only added a 10% impairment. The Applicant 
was able to work effectively in his job for about a year after his injuries 
healed. There is no evidence of a new injury, nor is there any medical 
evidence that the Applicant was taken off the job April 28, 1984, because of 
his old injuries. The Applicant just plain retired. He will now draw 
retirement benefits, Social Security and $241.00 per week for a comfortable 
rest of his life. By this reasoning many workers nearing retirement with 
previous injuries are also entitled to a nice comfor- table workmen's 
compensation retirement program. 
There is no issue of temporary total disability compensation. 
However, it must be noted that the Applicant received temporary total 
disability benefits following his December 1982 accident for the period from 
March 7, 1983, to June 27, 1983, at 16 weeks x $284.00 = $4,544.00. The 
Applicant was earning a sufficient income to entitle him to the maximum 
benefit for permanent and total disability of $241.00 per week for 312 weeks 
which would result in a total entitlement of $75,192.00. The Defendant should 
pay 12/33 or 36% of that amount which would equal 112.32 weeks less 16 weeks 
paid in temporary total disability benefits for a balance of 96.32 weeks, 
which when multiplied times $241.00 would equal $23,213.12c Payment should be 
made in a lump sum as accumulated from April 28, 1984, to February 22, 1985, a 
period of 43 weeks which when multiplied times $241.00 would equal $10,363.00 
to be paid in a lump sum. The balance is to be paid at the rate of $241.00 
per week until the balance is paid somewhere near June 22, 1986. Thereafter, 
the Second Injury Fund would commence payment on the balance due computed at 
the rate of 64% of 312 weeks or 199.68 weeks which when multiplied times 
$241.00 would equal $48,122.88 payment of which would commence at the expira-
tion of payments by the Defendant Company on or about March 1, 1986, and 
continued until paid in full. After the conclusion of the 312 weeks the 
Applicant is entitled to continued benefits at the rate of $241.00 per week 
from the Second Injury Fund unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. 
Applicant's attorney is entitled to attorney's fees based on 
$75,192.00 less $4,544.00 already paid in temporary total disability benefits 
or $70,648.00 in accordance with the Commission's formula, which would equal 
$10,065.00. We further note Ronald C. Barker performed legal services for 
Applicant and may be entitled to a portion of attorney's fees awarded if not 
already paid for his services. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Defendant Company and the Second Injury Fund should pay the sums 
set forth above. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Company pay the Applicant 
$23,213.12 with $10,363.00 to be paid in a lump sum and the balance payable at 
the rate of $241.00 per week commencing on or about February 22, 1985, until 
about March 1, 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the 
Second Injury Fund, pay the Applicant compensation based on 64% permanent 
total impairment at the rate of $241.00 per week for 199.68 weeks in the 
amount of $48,122.88 commencing with said weekly payment on or about June 22, 
1986, when payments from the Defendant Company terminate. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident, in accordance with the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roger D. Sandack, Attorney for the 
Applicant, be paid the sum of $10,065.00, the same to be deducted from the 
aforesaid award. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof speci-
fying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this 
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Keith E. Sohm 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
<f/ti\^ day of February, 1985. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the J}%4)^ day of February, 1985, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Eimco Process Equipment Company 
Attention: E.W. Chapman 
P.O. Box 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Robert R. Finch, Attorney at Law 
559 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Alma E. Peck 
56 West Sunset Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Roger D. Sandack, Attorney at Law 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By DeAnn 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALMA E. PECK, ) 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO. ] 
SECOND INJURY FUND and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ] 
UTAH, 
Respondents. 
) PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF REVIEW 
) Case No. 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Petitioner Alma E. Peck, by and through his attorney 
of record, Roger D. Sandack, hereby petitions this honorable 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 to review a Final 
Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah granting a Motion 
for Review filed by respondents, on the grounds and for the 
reasons that the Industrial Commission acted in excess of its 
powers, arbitrarily and capriciously and without substantial 
evidence and in violation of law in modifying a Final Order by 
an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission, dated 
March 26, 1985, by denying permanent total disability to 
petitioner, Alma E. Peck. 
Petitioner alleges in support hereof as follows: 
1. That on or about February 28, 1985, an 
Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission issued an 
Order, supplemented on March 26, 1985, which ordered defendants 
to pay to petitioner permanent total disability benefits based 
upon findings by the Administrative Law Judge that the 
petitioner was permanently totally disabled, and accordingly 
entitled to the benefits under Utah's workmen's compensation 
laws. 
2. Respondents filed a Motion to Review the 
Administrative Law Judge's finding, which motion was granted by 
Order dated August 30, 1985, The Industrial Commission's Order 
granting respondents' Motion to Review is not supported by fact 
or law. More specifically, the Industrial Commission found 
that the petitioner had been able to return to work after the 
industrial injury. The Industrial Commission completely 
ignored the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, the full 
and complete testimony of the petitioner that he was unable to 
perform his work and was allowed to continue only with the 
charity of fellow workers, and in fact was forced to retire by 
Eimco Corporation. As found by the report of the rehabilita-
tion counselor of the Utah State Office of Education, the 
petitioner was not a good candidate for rehabilitation and in 
fact was permanently totally disabled. 
3. Petitioner has not received any payment for the 
industrial injury which was sustained, as found not only by the 
Administrative Law Judge but also by the Industrial 
Commission. This matter should be placed upon an accelerated 
appeals calendar and the petitioner hereby requests an order 
specifically enforcing the weekly payment provisions as ordered 
by the Industrial Commission, pending appeal herein. 
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WHEREFORE, petitioner requests a Writ of Review be 
issued from this Court for the purpose of inquiring into the 
lawfulness of the Industrial Commission's order and reviewing 
the orders of the Industrial Commission and awarding petitioner 
the permanent total benefits entitled to him at the appropriate 
compensation rate, as provided by law, together with such other 
and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
DATED this ~2 7 day of September, 1985. 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 801/533-8383 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2484L 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that copies of the foregoing 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW were placed in the United States 
mail, pos-tage prepaid, to the following persons on this / 7-
day of ' ;, , ( 1985: 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Robert Finch, Esq. 
559 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Erie Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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